Unizo's Communications API provides webhooks to notify your application when important communication events occur across your integrated platforms. These real-time notifications enable you to build responsive applications that react immediately to message activity, channel updates, and user interactions.
Our platform normalizes webhook events from various communication providers (Slack, Microsoft Teams, Discord, etc.) into a consistent format, making it easy to handle events regardless of the underlying platform.
Triggered when a new channel or conversation is created
Triggered when channel properties are modified
Triggered when a channel is archived
Triggered when a user joins a channel
Triggered when a user leaves a channel
Triggered when a reaction is added to a message
Triggered when a reaction is removed from a message
Webhook Security
Every webhook request sent by Unizo includes a cryptographic signature so you can verify that the payload is authentic and has not been tampered with.
Security Headers
Header
Description
x-unizo-event-type
The type of event that triggered the webhook
x-unizo-signature
HMAC-SHA256 signature of the payload, prefixed with v1= (e.g., v1=ee084789...)
x-unizo-timestamp
Unix epoch timestamp (seconds) when the request was signed
x-unizo-delivery-id
Unique identifier for this webhook delivery
Signature Verification
The signed payload is constructed by joining the timestamp and the raw request body with a dot separator: {timestamp}.{payload}. This ensures the timestamp is covered by the signature, preventing replay attacks.
Verification Steps
Parse the timestamp from the x-unizo-timestamp header and reject the request if it falls outside your tolerance window (recommended: 5 minutes).
Reconstruct the signed payload by concatenating the timestamp, a literal dot (.), and the raw request body.
Compute the expected signature using HMAC-SHA256 with your webhook signing secret as the key.
Strip the v1= prefix from the x-unizo-signature header to get the received signature.
Compare the two signatures using a constant-time comparison function to prevent timing attacks.
Reference Implementation
const crypto = require("crypto");
function verifyWebhookSignature(
payload,
signatureHeader,
timestampHeader,
secret,
toleranceSeconds = 300
) {
// 1. Reject stale timestamps to prevent replay attacks
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const timestamp = parseInt(timestampHeader, 10);
if (Number.isNaN(timestamp)) {
return false;
}
if (Math.abs(now - timestamp) > toleranceSeconds) {
return false;
}
// 2. Reconstruct the signed payload: "{timestamp}.{payload}"
const signedPayload = `${timestamp}.${payload}`;
// 3. Compute the expected signature
const expected = crypto
.createHmac("sha256", secret)
.update(signedPayload)
.digest("hex");
// 4. Strip the "v1=" prefix from the received signature
const received = signatureHeader.startsWith("v1=")
? signatureHeader.slice(3)
: signatureHeader;
// 5. Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
try {
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(
Buffer.from(expected, "hex"),
Buffer.from(received, "hex")
);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// Usage
const isValid = verifyWebhookSignature(
rawBody, // raw request body string
headers["x-unizo-signature"], // "v1=ee084789..."
headers["x-unizo-timestamp"], // "1774093147"
process.env.UNIZO_WEBHOOK_SECRET // your signing secret
);
if (!isValid) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid signature" });
}
// Signature verified — process the event
handleEvent(JSON.parse(rawBody));